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Perceptual processing advantages for trauma-related
visual cues in post-traumatic stress disorder
B. Kleim, T. Ehring and A. Ehlers*
Department of Psychology, Institute of Psychiatry, King’s College London, UK
Background. Intrusive re-experiencing in post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) comprises distressing sensory
impressions from the trauma that seem to occur ‘out of the blue’. A key question is how intrusions are triggered.
One possibility is that PTSD is characterized by a processing advantage for stimuli that resemble those that
accompanied the trauma, which would lead to increased detection of such cues in the environment.
Method. We used a blurred picture identiﬁcation task in a cross-sectional (n=99) and a prospective study (n=221)
of trauma survivors.
Results. Participants with acute stress disorder (ASD) or PTSD, but not trauma survivors without these disorders,
identiﬁed trauma-related pictures, but not general threat pictures, better than neutral pictures. There were no group
diﬀerences in the rate of trauma-related answers to other picture categories. The relative processing advantage for
trauma-related pictures correlated with re-experiencing and dissociation, and predicted PTSD at follow-up.
Conclusions. A perceptual processing bias for trauma-related stimuli may contribute to the involuntary triggering of
intrusive trauma memories in PTSD.
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Introduction
Some trauma survivors are haunted by unwanted
distressing memories for years. These commonly take
the form of vivid and distressing sensory impressions
from the trauma that suddenly pop into one’s mind
and seem to come ‘out of the blue’. The sensations
are predominantly visual and subjectively seem to
happen in the ‘here and now’ rather than being
memories of past events (Ehlers et al. 2002; Michael
et al. 2005a). Such intrusive re-experiencing is a core
symptom of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
For example, a motor vehicle accident (MVA) survivor
may re-experience the sight of headlights coming
towards them, just like before the crash, or an assault
survivor may re-experience a glimpse of the assailant
standing before them with a knife, just like during the
assault.
Clinical observations suggest that a wide range of
stimuli trigger re-experiencing (e.g. Foa et al. 1989;
Brewin et al. 1996). However, key questions remain
regarding how and why re-experiencing is so easily
triggered in PTSD. Interview and questionnaire
studies have suggested that triggers are often percep-
tually similar to the intrusive content or to stimuli that
signalled the onset of these moments (Ehlers et al.
2004; Michael et al. 2005a). This raises the possibility
that people with PTSD may preferentially process
perceptual cues that are similar to those encountered
during trauma. Such a processing advantage would
have the consequence that trauma-related stimuli are
more readily noticed than other stimuli in the en-
vironment, and may then trigger intrusive trauma
memories through unintentional, cue-driven memory
retrieval (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Brewin et al. 1996,
2010).
Two lines of work in cognitive psychology suggest
that such a perceptual processing advantage for
trauma-related cues may develop after trauma. First,
people with anxiety disorders show selective attention
to threat cues. This cognitive bias selectively favours
the detection and processing of threat material (e.g.
Foa et al. 1991; Thrasher et al. 1994). It is generally
thought to be driven by a pre-attentive analysis of
whether or not a stimulus is threat related, followed
by an automatic shift of attention to the location of
threatening stimuli (O ¨ hman, 1993; O ¨ hman & Soares,
1993), although strategic allocation of attention such as
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ORIGINAL ARTICLEscanning for danger may also play a role. There is
some evidence that attentional bias to threat plays a
role in PTSD. In several studies using experimental
paradigms, such as the emotional Stroop test or dot-
probe paradigm, survivors with PTSD showed an
attentional bias towards trauma-related stimuli (e.g.
Foa et al. 1991; Bryant & Harvey, 1995; Moradi et al.
1999; Vythilingam et al. 2007; for reviews see Buckley
et al. 2000; Constans, 2005). The majority of these
studies investigated responses to trauma-related words
(e.g. ‘rape’, ‘bodybag’) and thus did not capture the
perceptual nature of stimuli that typically trigger
intrusive memories. As intrusive trauma memories
and their triggers seem to be primarily visual (Ehlers
et al. 2002), studies of perceptual processing of visual
stimuli in PTSD are needed.
Second, there is some evidence that perceptual
priming plays a role in PTSD. Perceptual priming
refers to a form of implicit memory that is charac-
terized by facilitated perception of a stimulus as the
result of previous exposure to this stimulus (e.g.
Schacter, 1992). It has been suggested that stimuli that
were temporally associated with trauma are strongly
primed in people with PTSD, hence leading to a re-
duced perceptual threshold for these stimuli (Ehlers &
Clark, 2000). Studies with healthy volunteers suggest
that perceptual priming may facilitate re-experiencing.
Several studies found that stimuli that occurred in a
traumatic context are more strongly primed than those
occurring in a neutral context. Visual stimuli were
embedded in traumatic and neutral picture stories,
and perceptual priming was assessed later with a
picture identiﬁcation task (Arntz et al. 2005; Ehlers
et al. 2006a; Michael & Ehlers, 2007). The degree of
priming for objects from the trauma stories indeed
predicted subsequent intrusive re-experiencing (Ehlers
et al. 2006a; Michael & Ehlers, 2007).
Several clinical studies further found that stimuli
associated with the trauma can be more strongly
primed post-trauma in people with PTSD than in
those without PTSD. Participants encoded trauma-
related and control stimuli, and priming was tested
later with word-stem completion or perceptual
identiﬁcation tasks. The results mostly support the
hypothesis of greater perceptual priming for material
associated with the trauma in people with PTSD
compared to those without PTSD (Amir et al. 1996;
Michael et al. 2005b; Ehring & Ehlers, 2011; but see
McNally & Amir, 1996, for negative ﬁndings). Amir
et al. (2010) used picture clarity ratings as a measure
of implicit memory for previously encoded trauma-
related, negative and neutral pictures. Trauma sur-
vivors with PTSD showed a greater implicit memory
bias for trauma and negative pictures relative to
neutral pictures than those without PTSD.
The present two studies tested the hypothesis
that, after trauma, a relative processing advantage
for trauma-related perceptual stimuli compared to
neutral stimuli in the environment (processing ad-
vantage for trauma-related cues, PAT) contributes to
intrusive re-experiencing, and thus the development
of PTSD. We expected that trauma survivors with
PTSD or acute stress disorder (ASD, a precursor of
PTSD in the ﬁrst month post-trauma) show a proces-
sing advantage for trauma-related material compared
to neutral material. Trauma survivors were asked
to identify blurred, not easily recognizable pictures
that resembled stimuli they were likely to have en-
countered during their trauma, along with blurred
neutral pictures. If PAT is a risk factor for PTSD, then
trauma survivors with ASD/PTSD should display
such a processing advantage for trauma-related per-
ceptual stimuli and should be better at identifying
blurred trauma-related pictures than blurred neutral
pictures, whereas trauma survivors without ASD/
PTSD would not be expected to show diﬀerences in
identiﬁcation rates (Hypothesis 1). Blurred pictures of
general threatening content unrelated to the trauma
were included to test the speciﬁcity of the hypothe-
sized processing advantage. We further expected that
a processing advantage for trauma-related material
would be associated with intrusive trauma memories,
with the subjective experience that these appear ‘out
of the blue’, and other re-experiencing symptoms
including dissociative reactions (Hypothesis 2). We
also predicted that PAT would be associated with
fear and perceptual processing during the trauma
(Hypothesis 3), and that it would predict chronic
PTSD (Hypothesis 4).
Method
Participants
Participants were trauma survivors who had been
treated for their injuries in an Emergency Department
in South London, UK, following an MVA or assault.
Study 1 is a cross-sectional study of 99 MVA survivors
who were assessed between 3 and 12 months after the
accident (see Ehring et al. 2006, for details). As shown
in Table 1, 22 (22.0%) of the participants met diag-
nostic criteria for PTSD. Study 2 is a prospective study
that assessed assault survivors at 2 weeks (n=221) and
6 months (n=202) after the trauma (see Kleim et al.
2007, for details). At 2 weeks, 37 participants (16.7%)
met diagnostic criteria for ASD, and at 6 months, 46
(22.7%) met criteria for PTSD. Table 1 shows sample
characteristics.
Participants ﬁrst received an information sheet
about the study in the mail and were then invited by
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obtained at the beginning of the research session after
the experimenter had given a complete description
of the study and answered all questions. Participants
were reimbursed with £30 (Study 1) or £50 (Study 2)
for their time and travel expenses.
Picture identiﬁcation task
This task was developed for the purposes of this
study. Participants saw blurred pictures on a com-
puter screen and were asked to name the main object,
person or situation shown in the picture. The stimuli
were either trauma-related, general threat-related or
neutral pictures.
Stimulus material
Pictures were approximately 9 cmr12 cm in size and
had been blurred using a Gaussian ﬁlter (Adobe
Photoshop 3.0). The MVA version of the task (Study 1)
comprised two subcategories of nine trauma-related
pictures, namely traﬃc-related (e.g. traﬃc lights,
speedometer) and accident-related pictures (e.g. air-
bag, police car), and also nine general threat pictures
and nine neutral pictures. For the assault version of
the task, there were 10 assault-related pictures (e.g.
knife, ﬁst, gun), 10 general threat pictures and 10
neutral pictures. Table 2 lists the picture content for
both versions.
To adjust the degree of blurring, a series of pilot
studies was conducted for each version with volun-
teers who had never been involved in an MVA/
assault. Each picture was blurred to the level where
approximately 50% of volunteers correctly identiﬁed
the picture. Mean identiﬁcation rates were identical
for all categories in the pilot samples (MVA task:
mean = 0.47 for all categories, S.D.=0.15–0.26; assault
task: mean = 0.47 for all categories, S.D.=0.19–0.22)
and paired t tests of mean identiﬁcation rates were all
non-signiﬁcant (all p>0.96).
Table 1. Sample characteristics for Studies 1 and 2
Variable
Study 1: Cross-sectional MVA Study 2: Prospective assault
PTSD
(n=22)
No PTSD
(n=77)
Statistical
signiﬁcance
x
2 or F, p
ASD
(n=36)
No ASD
(n=185)
Statistical
signiﬁcance
x
2 or F, p
Sex; proportion male, n (%) 11 (50) 44 (57) 0.47, 0.63 18 (50) 130 (82) 5.0, 0.03
Ethnicity; proportion Caucasian,
n (%)
15 (68) 60 (78) 1.01, 0.40 19 (53) 107 (58) 2.86, 0.24
Socio-economic statusa, n (%) 8.14, 0.09 10.05, 0.02
Very low income (<£10000) 9 (41) 15 (21) 21 (58) 74 (40)
Low income (£10000–£20000) 6 (27) 14 (19) 6 (17) 42 (23)
Moderate/high income
(£20000– £40000)
7 (32) 44 (61) 4 (11) 59 (32)
Refused information 0 (0) 4 (4) 5 (14) 10 (5)
Marital status, n (%) 1.54, 0.46 4.0, 0.41
Single 15 (68) 42 (55) 25 (70) 121 (65)
Married 6 (27) 24 (32) 4 (11) 37 (20)
Divorced/separated 1 (5) 10 (13) 7 (19) 21 (11)
Refused information 0 (0) 1 (0) 0 (0) 6 (3)
Education, n (%) 4.84, 0.18 7.79, 0.10
No examinations 4 (18) 5 (7) 11 (31) 35 (19)
A-Levelb/O-Levelsc 6 (28) 28 (36) 16 (44) 67 (36)
Bachelor/postgraduate degree 7 (32) 35 (46) 6 (17) 59 (32)
Other 5 (23) 8 (11) 3 (8) 24 (13)
Employment status, n (%) 2.08, 0.23 15.49, <0.001
Employed/studying 15 (68) 63 (82) 16 (44) 134 (72)
Unemployed/retired 7 (32) 14 (18) 20 (56) 51 (28)
Age (years), mean (S.D.) 37.41 (14.52) 34.39 (9.30) 1.52, 0.22 38.7 (12.37) 33.60 (11.09) 5.62, 0.019
PTSD symptom severity, mean (S.D.) 26.50 (8.99) 8.32 (8.09) 84.34, <0.001 34.47 (9.46) 16.52 (10.10) 83.79, <0.001
MVA, Motor vehicle accident; PTSD, post-traumatic stress disorder; ASD, acute stress disorder; S.D., standard deviation.
aCombined household income.
bEquivalent to 13 years of education.
cEquivalent to 11 years of education.
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Blurred pictures were presented on a computer screen
in random order. Each picture was preceded by a
ﬁxation cross. Participants were asked to name the
main object or situation as quickly as possible. Partici-
pants saw two practice pictures (horse, hamburger)
to ensure that the instructions were clear. In Study 1,
pictures were terminated when participants pressed a
key indicating they were ready to respond. In Study 2,
pictures disappeared automatically with voice onset.
Answers were tape-recorded to allow exact scoring
after the session.
Measures of PTSD symptoms and
cognitive processing
Diagnoses
Post-traumatic diagnoses were assessed with stan-
dardized structured clinical interviews by two trained
master-level psychologists. In Study 1, PTSD diag-
noses were established with the Structured Clinical
Interview for DSM-IV (SCID; First et al. 1996). In Study
2, participants were interviewed with the Acute Stress
Disorder Scale (Bryant & Harvey, 2000) at 2 weeks
after the assault to assess ASD. At the 6-month
follow-up, the same interviewer conducted the SCID
over the telephone to assess PTSD. Inter-rater reli-
ability was high (k=0.97 for ASD, k=0.82 for PTSD;
based on n=56 interviews, two trained raters who
were blind to each others’ ratings).
PTSD symptom severity
The Posttraumatic Stress Diagnostic Scale (PDS; Foa
et al. 1997) is a standardized and validated self-report
measure of PTSD symptom severity that has been
widely used with clinical and non-clinical samples of
traumatized individuals. The PDS asks participants to
rate 17 items regarding how much they were bothered
by each of the PTSD symptoms speciﬁed in DSM-IV
ranging from 0 (never) to 3 (ﬁve times a week or
more/very severely). The ﬁrst ﬁve items correspond to
re-experiencing symptoms.
Intrusive trauma memories
The presence of intrusive trauma memories in the past
week was assessed using the Intrusion Interview, a
semi-structured interview that covers intrusion fre-
quency, modality and distress (Michael et al. 2005a).
Intrusive memories were scored as present if partici-
pants reported unintentional memories of aspects of
the trauma with a distress rating of at least 60.
Table 2. Pictures used in motor vehicle accident (MVA) and assault versions of the blurred picture task
Trauma-related
Accident Traﬃc General threat Neutral
Study 1
Airbag Bollard Cemetery Letter box
Ambulance Cars at night Aggressive dog Cup
Broken window Motorbike helmet Gun Door handle
Crashed car Rear light of car Injection Dustbin
Crash test dummy Road marking Explosion Fork
Front of a car Seat belt Sinking ship Coat hangers
Neck brace Speedometer Skulls Iron
Police car Traﬃc lights Snake Razor
Stretcher Traﬃc jam Spider Desk fan
Study 2
Abduction with knife Crashed car Letter box
Baseball bat Junkie Door handle
Knife Dog Hair dryer
Bloody hands Earthquakea Dustbin
Dark alley Grey shark Chair
Eyesa Sinking ship Iron
Fist Skulls Toilet paper
Gang Spider Toaster
Man in hooded shirt Volcano Towela
Masked man War scene Pepper jar
aIdentiﬁcation rates for these pictures were constantly at ﬂoor or at ceiling and they were excluded from the analyses.
176 B. Kleim et al.‘Out of the blue’ memories
The item ‘I am reminded of the accident/assault
for no apparent reason’ from the Trauma Memory
Questionnaire (Halligan et al. 2003) was used to assess
whether participants perceived intrusive memories as
occurring ‘out of the blue’.
Dissocation
The State Dissociation Questionnaire (SDQ; Murray
et al. 2002) assessed ongoing dissociation, a common
feature of chronic PTSD. The nine-item SDQ assesses
diﬀerent aspects of dissociation such as derealization,
depersonalization, detachment, altered time sense,
emotional numbing, and reduction of awareness in
surroundings. It has been shown to be reliable and
to predict PTSD after trauma (Murray et al. 2002;
Halligan et al. 2003). Internal consistencies in the
present samples were a=0.90 and a=0.95 respect-
ively.
Fear and data-driven processing during trauma
In Study 2, participants completed the Peritraumatic
Fear Scale to assess the degree of fear during the
trauma (Halligan et al. 2003). Participants rated the
degree to which they felt a list of emotions during
the trauma (e.g. fearful, terriﬁed), each on a scale from
0 (not at all) to 4 (very strongly), a=0.90. The Data-
driven Processing Scale (Halligan et al. 2003) assesses
the extent to which participants engaged primarily in
perceptual processing during the assault (e.g. ‘It was
just a stream of unconnected impressions following
each other’). The scale has been shown to have good
internal consistency and validity (Halligan et al. 2002,
2003). Internal consistency was a=0.86.
Data analyses
The main dependent variable was the proportion of
correctly identiﬁed pictures in the blurred picture task.
To check for a possible response bias towards giving
trauma-related answers regardless of picture content,
we determined how many of the incorrect answers in
response to general threat and neutral pictures were
trauma related (false alarms). Mixed design ANOVAs
with picture type (trauma, general threat, neutral)
as the within-subject variable and diagnostic group
(Study 1: PTSD versus No-PTSD; Study 2; ASD versus
No-ASD) as the between-group variable tested diﬀer-
ences in identiﬁcation rates between diagnostic
groups. In line with Hypothesis 1, we expected a
signiﬁcant interaction between diagnostic group and
picture type.
In Study 1, preliminary analyses showed that there
were no diﬀerences in identiﬁcation rates for accident
and traﬃc pictures [F(1,97)=0.00, p=0.95], and no
interaction between subcategory and group [F(1,97)=
0.24, p=0.63]. Thus, the main analyses in Study 1 were
carried out by combining both sets of trauma-related
pictures.
The relative processing advantage for trauma-
related stimuli (PAT) was deﬁned as the diﬀerence
score: the identiﬁcation rate for trauma-related
pictures minus the identiﬁcation rate for neutral
pictures. The expected associations (Hypothesis 2) of
PAT with intrusive memories and features of PTSD
were assessed with point-biserial correlations (for
dichotomous measures) or Pearson correlation (for
continuous measures). PDS and SDQ scores were
square-root transformed to normalize distributions.
In Study 2, Pearson correlations tested correlations
with responses during the trauma (Hypothesis 3),
and a logistic regression analysis tested whether PAT
predicts later PTSD diagnosis (Hypothesis 4). a was
set at 0.05.
Results
Study 1: Cross-sectional study of MVA survivors
Overall identiﬁcation rates and test of response bias
Mean picture identiﬁcation rates across diagnostic
groups were in a similar range as in the pilot study
(mean=0.50, S.D.=0.20 for traﬃc pictures, mean=
0.51, S.D.=0.22 for accident-related pictures, mean=
0.50, S.D.=0.20 for general threat pictures, and
mean=0.47, S.D.=0.19 for neutral pictures). An
ANOVA showed that there were no diﬀerences in re-
sponse bias between the PTSD and No-PTSD groups
for traﬃc- and accident-related answers in response
to general threat and neutral pictures [F(1,97)=2.04,
p=0.156 for traﬃc-related answers; F(1,97)=0.28,
p=0.596 for accident-related answers].
Group diﬀerences (Hypothesis 1)
The results for the picture identiﬁcation task are
displayed in Table 3. A 2 (diagnostic group: PTSD,
No-PTSD)r3 [picture type: trauma-related (accident
or traﬃc), general threat, neutral] ANOVA showed
no signiﬁcant main eﬀect of diagnostic group
[F(1,97)=0.002, p=0.967] but a signiﬁcant main eﬀect
of picture type [F(2,194)=3.53, p=0.031], and the
expected interaction between diagnostic group and
picture type [F(2,194)=3.08, p=0.048]. Separate
follow-up analyses for each diagnostic group showed,
as expected, a signiﬁcant eﬀect of picture type for the
PTSD group [F(2,42)=6.20, p=0.004] but not for the
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group identiﬁed more trauma-related pictures than
neutral pictures [F(1,21)=14.52, p<0.001]. They
showed intermediate identiﬁcation rates for general
threat pictures, which did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from
those for trauma-related [F(1,21)=3.39, p=0.080] and
neutral pictures [F(1,21)=2.30, p=0.144].
Correlations of PAT with intrusive memories and
features of PTSD (Hypothesis 2)
As expected, PAT correlated with the presence of
intrusive memories in the past week [point-biserial
correlation (rpbis)=0.21], with the participants’ reports
that these appeared ‘out of the blue’ (r=0.28), the
severity of PTSD (r=0.23) and re-experiencing symp-
toms as measured by the PDS (r=0.20, all p’s <0.05)
and dissociative symptoms (r=0.30, p<0.01).
Study 2: Prospective study of assault survivors
Preliminary analyses and test of response bias
Mean picture identiﬁcation rates across diagnostic
groups were generally lower than in the pilot study
(mean=0.40, S.D.=0.20 for assault, mean=0.34, S.D.=
0.21 for general threat, and mean=0.32, S.D.=0.21 for
neutral pictures). Identiﬁcation rates for three pictures
(one in each category) were consistently at ﬂoor or
at ceiling across all participants (see Table 2); data
for these pictures were thus excluded from further
analyses. There were no diﬀerences in response
bias (assault-related answers in response to general
threat and neutral pictures) between the ASD and
No-ASD groups [F(1,219)=1.36, p=0.244]. We also
tested whether any of the sample characteristics that
diﬀered signiﬁcantly between the ASD and No-ASD
groups (see Table 1) were signiﬁcantly related to
PAT. There were no signiﬁcant correlations (all
p’s=0.09–0.36).
Group diﬀerences (Hypothesis 1)
A 2 (diagnostic group: ASD, No-ASD)r3 (picture
type: assault, general threat, neutral) ANOVA showed
signiﬁcant main eﬀects of picture type [F(2,438)=7.54,
p<0.001] and diagnostic group [F(1,219)=4.66,
p=0.032], and the hypothesized interaction between
diagnostic group and picture type [F(2,438)=4.42,
p=0.013]. Subsequent separate ANOVAs for the
diagnostic groups showed signiﬁcant eﬀects of picture
type for the ASD group [F(2,70)=10.11, p<0.001] but
not the No-ASD group [F(2,368)=1.96, p=0.142].
As expected, the ASD group identiﬁed assault-related
pictures signiﬁcantly better than neutral pictures
[F(1,35)=16.43, p<0.001] and general threat pictures
[F(1,35)=7.72, p=0.009]. The diﬀerence between
general threat and neutral pictures was not signiﬁcant
within the ASD group [F(1,35)=3.98, p=0.054]. The
results are shown in Table 3.
Correlations of PAT with intrusive memories and features
of PTSD (Hypothesis 2)
As expected, PAT correlated with the presence of
intrusive memories in the past week (rpbis=0.14,
p<0.05), with the participants’ reports that these ap-
peared ‘out of the blue’ (r=0.19), the severity of PTSD
(r=0.18) and re-experiencing symptoms as measured
by the PDS (r=0.20), and dissociative symptoms
(r=0.21, all p<0.01).
Correlations with fear and processing during trauma
(Hypothesis 3)
PAT correlated with fear (r=0.19, p<0.01) and with
data-driven processing during the trauma (r=0.26,
p<0.001).
Prediction of PTSD at 6 months (Hypothesis 4)
The logistic regression analysis showed that PAT in
the blurred picture task predicted a diagnosis of PTSD
Table 3. Mean (S.D.) picture identiﬁcation rates for participants with and without post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD, Study 1) and
acute stress disorder (ASD, Study 2)
Trauma-related
pictures
General
threat
pictures
Neutral
pictures
Relative processing advantage
for trauma-related pictures
Study 1 Accident or Traﬃc Accident or Traﬃc
PTSD (n = 22) 0.55 (0.21) 0.47 (0.17) 0.42 (0.17) 0.12 (0.15)
No PTSD (n = 77) 0.49 (0.16) 0.48 (0.23) 0.49 (0.19) 0.00 (0.19)
Study 2 Assault Assault
ASD (n = 36) 0.35 (0.18) 0.28 (0.14) 0.22 (0.19) 0.13 (0.20)
No ASD (n = 185) 0.36 (0.21) 0.32 (0.20) 0.34 (0.22) 0.02 (024)
S.D., Standard deviation.
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2(1, n=202)=6.131, p=
0.013, odds ratio (OR) 6.04, 95% conﬁdence interval
(CI) 1.39–26.25, Nagelkerke R
2=0.045]. Participants
who identiﬁed more trauma-related pictures relative
to neutral pictures were at greater risk of having PTSD
at follow-up. Nagelkerke’s R
2 indicated that this was a
small eﬀect.
Discussion
Two studies tested the hypothesis that a post-trauma
processing advantage for trauma-related perceptual
stimuli (PAT) contributes to intrusive re-experiencing
and thus to the development of PTSD and ASD.
Consistent with this hypothesis, participants with
PTSD or ASD identiﬁed trauma-related stimuli in a
novel blurred picture task better than neutral stimuli.
By contrast, trauma survivors without PTSD or
ASD showed the same pattern as non-traumatized
volunteers in the pilot studies in that they identiﬁed
trauma-related and neutral pictures equally well.
These ﬁndings suggest that, compared to neutral
stimuli, trauma survivors with post-traumatic dis-
orders preferentially process stimuli that are remi-
niscent of perceptual impressions during the trauma.
They extend previous reports that trauma-related
words and sentences are preferentially attended to
and can be more strongly primed post-trauma in
people with PTSD than in those without PTSD (e.g.
Foa et al. 1991; Bryant & Harvey, 1995; Amir et al.
1996; Moradi et al. 1999; Michael et al. 2005b;
Vythilingam et al. 2007). The results were not due to
response bias as there were no group diﬀerences in
trauma-related answers to neutral or general threat
pictures. In addition, the ﬁndings were speciﬁc to
trauma-related pictures as there was no processing
advantage for general threat pictures in either group;
both groups did not identify general threat pictures
better than neutral pictures. Although a direct com-
parison of trauma and general threat pictures within
the PTSD group in Study 1 only showed a trend for
signiﬁcance (p=0.080), the ASD group in Study 2
identiﬁed trauma-related pictures better than general
threat pictures. The overall pattern of results suggests
that the processing bias for trauma-related material in
ASD and PTSD assessed with this task is a perceptual
bias, rather than a conceptual bias.
It is noteworthy that, in Study 2, PAT was due to a
lower identiﬁcation of neutral stimuli in the ASD
groups compared to the No-ASD groups rather than a
better identiﬁcation of trauma-related stimuli. This
ﬁnding may indicate that a reduced awareness of
stimuli that indicate safety and normality contributes
to PTSD, and to patients’ impression that their current
environment is threatening (Ehlers & Clark, 2000).
The overall lower performance of participants with
PTSD/ASD compared to those without PTSD/ASD in
this study is consistent with general concentration
deﬁcits (e.g. Bryant & Harvey, 1997) and relative per-
formance deﬁciencies on tasks of sustained attention
and initial information acquisition (Vasterling et al.
1997) found in other studies.
In both studies, PAT was related to re-experiencing
symptoms and with reports that these appear ‘out of
the blue’. PAT may thus be one of the mechanisms
involved in the involuntary triggering of memories
from the trauma. The ﬁnding that PAT also predicted
PTSD at the 6-month follow-up in Study 2 further
supports this hypothesis. The latter extends ﬁndings
that enhanced priming for trauma-related words in a
word-stem completion task predicted PTSD symp-
toms at follow-up (Michael et al. 2005b; Ehring &
Ehlers, 2011). Together, the ﬁndings are in line with
the hypothesis that a processing advantage for stimuli
associated with the traumatic event contributes to
PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Further research into the
exact mechanisms is needed. PAT is likely to facilitate
the detection of trauma reminders in the survivors’
everyday environment. These in turn, by association,
may trigger re-experiencing symptoms such as un-
wanted trauma memories and/or aﬀective states such
as fear or dissociation. Furthermore, patients with
PTSD overestimate the likelihood of further harm
(e.g. Foa et al. 1999), and the enhanced processing of
trauma-related cues compared to neutral cues in their
environment may contribute to these impressions.
Finally, PAT may increase the chances that trauma
survivors initiate dysfunctional coping responses such
as avoidance, thought suppression or rumination.
In line with Hypothesis 3, PAT was associated with
fear and data-driven processing during the trauma.
The association with fear is consistent with memory
enhancing eﬀects of emotional arousal during en-
coding (e.g. McGaugh, 2000; Arntz et al. 2005; LaBar
& Cabeza, 2006), which may lead to superior recog-
nition of emotionally arousing compared to neutral
stimuli (e.g. Dolcos et al. 2005). The correlation with
data-driven processing is in line with the role of
perceptual processing highlighted in theories of
PTSD (e.g. Brewin et al. 1996, 2010; Ehlers & Clark,
2000) and with Roediger’s (1990) transfer-appropriate
processing approach.
The present studies have strengths and limitations.
Among the strengths is the cross-validation of the
ﬁndings in two independent samples of trauma
survivors, using two trauma-speciﬁc versions of the
blurred picture task. Furthermore, the prospective
design of Study 2 allowed us to show that PAT is
not only associated with PTSD concurrently but also
predicts PTSD 6 months later.
Perceptual processing advantages in PTSD 179Among the limitations is that the task used stan-
dardized rather than individualized picture sets so
that it is likely that not all of the trauma-related stimuli
were equally relevant to the participants. The stimuli
that people perceive during their trauma vary widely
so that it is diﬃcult to test priming for the idiosyncratic
stimuli that individuals encountered during their
trauma in clinical populations. Idiosyncratic stimuli
may have yielded greater eﬀect sizes (for an example
of the generation of idiosyncratic picture material, see
Elsesser et al. 2004).
Further studies, including experimental studies, are
needed to investigate the speciﬁc cognitive processes
that underlie PAT. The present studies were not
designed to determine whether PAT represents an
attentional or memory bias. As the present studies
aimed to assess perceptual bias for stimuli that re-
sembled those encountered during the trauma, there
was no new encoding phase of the stimuli during the
experiment. Although this lends greater ecological
validity to the ﬁndings, the source of the processing
advantage remains to be determined. If PAT reﬂects a
memory bias, it may be due to enhanced perceptual
encoding during trauma, enhanced retention or facili-
tation of retrieval. Clinical observations would be
consistent with an implicit memory eﬀect, as patients
are often not aware of the triggers of their traumatic
memories and perceive them as coming ‘out of
the blue’ (Ehlers et al. 2002). Experimental analogue
studies found that volunteers who saw traumatic ﬁlms
or picture stories showed enhanced priming for
stimuli that occurred in a traumatic context compared
to those occurring in a neutral context (Arntz et al.
2005; Ehlers et al. 2006a; Michael & Ehlers, 2007). This
suggests that it is possible that the present results
reﬂect greater visual priming for stimuli that were
present during the trauma in the PTSD group.
In conclusion, the present results show that
trauma survivors with ASD or PTSD show a relative
processing advantage for trauma-related stimuli com-
pared to neutral stimuli, which is linked to intrusive
re-experiencing. This is in line with the clinical ob-
servation that trauma survivors with PTSD show in-
trusive re-experiencing of aspects of the trauma in the
presence of sensory cues that match those encountered
during the trauma (Ehlers et al. 2004). Further work
is required to determine whether this perceptual
processing advantage reﬂects attentional bias or a
priming eﬀect, and whether it interacts with other
memory processes, such as Pavlovian conditioning
and trauma memory elaboration, in contributing to
intrusive memories following trauma. Future studies
should also examine whether changes in PAT ac-
company reductions in re-experiencing symptoms,
that is during successful cognitive therapy, where
trauma memories become more elaborated and cue-
driven retrieval of involuntary memories typically
decreases (Ehlers et al. 2005). There is some evidence
from analogue studies that processing of the traumatic
experience may reduce both perceptual processing
advantages and re-experiencing (Michael & Ehlers,
2007; Ehlers et al. 2010).
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